**Pt1: Move to Critical and Military Support to Police**

I am David Roney, Deputy National Coordinator, Protect & Prepare.

This briefing is a follow on from the briefing by DAC D’Orsi yesterday and is intended to update you regarding the security stance now that the UK has moved to a Critical threat level from international terrorism as a result of the attack in Manchester on Monday night and the ongoing investigation relating to that attack.

The briefing will be in two parts; I will give you an overview of the move to Critical and the use of military in support of police and Richard Harding the Head of NaCTSO will give you some advice about practical aspects of increasing security whilst we sit at Critical.

As you will be aware, following COBR yesterday evening JTAC has raised the Threat level to Critical, meaning an attack is imminent. This decision has been taken because those leading the investigation into the attack cannot rule out whether the perpetrator was acting alone or was part of a group. It will take a while for that issue to be bottomed out and bearing in mind the general tempo of activity by Daesh across Europe it makes sense to move to a higher level of threat readiness. I must reiterate at this time that there is no specific intelligence to indicate any specific threat.

What this means in practical terms is that you can expect to see a higher level of policing activity across the country, particularly in London. A significant amount of that additional policing will be armed. To enable that deployment of additional armed police the Government has invoked Operation Temperer. This is a pre-planned joint military and policing operation designed to release armed police officers to be part of the national Strategic Armed Policing Reserve to provide security patrols.

Initial deployments will focus on London in-line with prepared plans with additional phases across the country initiated over the course of today.

Current planning is that almost 1000 personnel will be deployed today, 760 directly backfilling Authorised Firearms Officers and the rest performing command and control functions. (This number is likely to change over the coming days in response to the evolving police requirement).

In London you will see these resources carrying out some of the duties more traditionally carried out by police, security at public buildings etc. You may also see some in public areas supporting police.

Outside of London you will see the military deployed to military bases and nuclear sites.

This will allow police to provide more armed resources on patrol and at some major events in the next few days.

It is anticipated that this rise in the threat level and the deployment of military resources will not be a long term position and we will keep stakeholders updated of a change in any security stance.

At this stage there are no plans for further bridge calls, when the threat level changes there will be a further message, I would remind you that a reduction to severe still means that an attack is highly likely.

As always your own security complements your security approach and I will hand over to Richard now to give you some practical advice around how you can enhance your security whilst we are at Critical…..

**Pt2: Move to Critical Protective Security Advice**

Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, I am Richard Harding the head of NaCTSO. Following the events in Manchester we have provided advice to you all via a bridge call yesterday, and through updated advice and guidance on the NaCTSO Website ( [www.gov.uk/nactso](http://www.gov.uk/nactso) ). Since that time the threat level has increased to Critical, and as stated this means that that an attack is believed to be imminent; I know that you will be very aware of the implications of this decision on the security picture within the UK and for your respective businesses and sectors.

I would remind you that despite being at the highest level of threat this assessment is generic and does not provide any detail as to locations or timings, and whilst it is true that an attack could occur anywhere at any time we know that there are factors that potentially make some locations more attractive or vulnerable to terrorist attack than others.

We provided you with advice yesterday and directed your attention to the more detailed advice available on the NaCTSO and CPNI websites to supplement this, however I am aware from conversations with colleagues in industry that you would potentially welcome some greater granularity to allow you to focus your activities in the most productive ways. I will not therefore concentrate on the need for Business Continuity plans, testing and exercising etc. but rather what you might practically do to configure your response to this heightened threat. This is not intended to be a comprehensive review of activity but to prompt your thinking.

I would therefore recommend that you consider:

In general

1. Encouraging staff to actively monitor news and media sources to ensure they maintain situational awareness.
2. Review your security plans to ensure that they are fit for purpose and ensure that your staff, volunteers and where appropriate visitors or contractors are aware of their contents.
3. It would be easy to concentrate on suicide IED as the threat, however you should ensure that you focus your planned response on the full range of potential terrorist attack methodologies, particularly those from vehicle as a weapon, bladed weapons and IED’s (person bourne, placed or vehicle), although other methodologies should be actively considered.
4. Given the generic nature of the threat and that some location are more likely to be more attractive to hostile threat actors, you should carefully consider the level of threat and therefore the appropriate responses at your individual sites and, where appropriate, across your portfolios. In undertaking this task you may wish to consider such factors as location, proximity to iconic or crowded places, or other pertinent factors. For example you might prioritise your locations in city centres, near sporting or entertainment venues and transport hubs for security uplift and activity.
5. You should ensure that where you decide to instigate additional security or other measures that all your staff at the relevant locations are briefed, know their roles and responsibilities, and have access to the relevant corporate plans, policies and guidance.
6. You should consider how your resources and capabilities are deployed to deter, detect and disrupt and thus defeat hostile threat actors and terrorists:

To do this you would want to consider the following :

* 1. The use of your communication channels to reassure legitimate users of your sites and to project a hostile operating environment for threat actors.
	2. The proactive deployment of security resources to conduct unpredictable security activities both within and in the footprint around your sites and venues to deter hostile reconnaissance and detect suspicious behaviour. They should be encouraged to engage individuals acting anomalously to determine what the cause is.
	3. Ensure all staff take responsibility for security, not just security personnel. They should be reminded to be vigilant, and use their customer service skills to proactively engage with customers, visitors and others.
	4. Active engagement with customers, visitors and individuals at or in the vicinity of locations in the way described above is both an opportunity to help and reassure legitimate site users and, in context to, deter or detect hostile threat actors.
	5. Engage with your neighbours to ensure that your plans and activities are mutually supportive. In particular you may wish to ensure that any security activities are coordinated to ensure that gaps and inefficiencies are avoided.
	6. Ensure that your staff are briefed on the threat and what constitutes suspicious behaviour. They will know what is normal for their regular places of work and what is not, positively encourage them to investigate or report things which feel out of place to the ordinary and have mechanisms to escalate such reporting.
	7. Ensure that your personnel are aware that ethnicity, religion, colour, clothing, and gender are not helpful in identifying hostile threat actors or terrorists. However such individuals are likely to display suspicious or non-baseline behaviours. Again it is important to stress that this different behaviour may have many causes both benign and malign, and is not an indicator of terrorism. It is only through identifying, engaged and assessing why someone is behaving differently that a conclusion can be drawn.
1. Consider your action on suspicious activity and object reporting
	1. What are your ‘action on’ plans if your security or staff identify a suspicious individual or objects outside or inside your premises?
	2. Are your staff aware of their options for Evacuation/ Invacuation/ Lockdown procedures, and do your plans include provision for vulnerable staff and visitors?
	3. Do your staff know where the emergency assembly points?
	4. Have you identified any protected spaces within your venues and do staff know where they are?
	5. Are your staff lists up to date and accessible so that you can account for them in the event of an incident?
2. Search and Screening
3. Given finite resources ensure you should consider focusing it on addressing your highest priority threats
4. Configure your search regime to the threat you are looking to mitigate – E.g. prioritise detection of larger threats, accepting smaller items may not be detected *If you are primarily worried about mass-casualty threats, don’t look for penknives*
5. Configure any search and screening regimes to minimise queues
6. Stadia and venues specific considerations:

In addition stadia and venues may additionally wish to consider the following:

1. review event schedules and associated safety & security plans for the next 20 days and then on a rolling basis as long as the heightened alert state persists. This time period should not be taken as an indicator the anticipated duration of the heighted threat level, but rather prudent planning advice.
2. Consider staged or managed dispersal through multiple exit points to minimise crowd densities at the end of an event
3. Consider security and perimeter surveillance at of all stages of event. In particular consider how you manage the dispersal phase of an event and how you use your personnel and security resources to continue to recognise and react to suspicious behaviour and objects.
4. Ensure activity deployed to identify and act on suspicious behaviour is maintained for the dispersal phase of an event and that known entry and exit points are considered within any plan.
5. Consider your extended footprint as part of any security and safety planning/ activity
6. Consider maintaining the same perimeter control measures at the end of an event as you would at the start.
7. Ensure that the public are aware of enhanced security measures before arrival to enhance compliance and ensure that they do not bring items that would slow down any search regime you have in place.
8. Consider your ability to actively message staff and visitors within your venue to pass on instructions or information in the event of an incident or response to a threat.

In conclusion as discussed this is not intended to be a comprehensive list, and we will be publishing supporting guidance on our website to complement this briefing. NaCTSO will continue to provide advice and I would recommend that if you have specific issues that you engage with you relevant forces CTSAs.

However my overall message would be that despite the challenging and horrific nature of the threat we face there are things that you can do to make a difference and to meet this challenge. Leadership is the key to meeting this challenge, and individuals conducting dynamic risk assessments and taking the lead in the event of an incident or suspicious activity will save lives.